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The primary concern in the resource-based view of the firm has been competition. For many firms, 
however, the relevant ecology includes parasites as well as competitors – notably product 
counterfeiters who parasitically exploit a firm’s reputational resource. This parasitic process both 
diminishes the reputational resource it exploits, and produces significant risk of harm as a by-product. 
This article extends the resource-based view, presenting an account of the mechanism by which 
competition and parasitism co-evolve and produce a distinctive form of resource erosion. It does so 
using a model which, because a firm’s reputational resource exists distributedly in the minds of 
mutually-influencing but not centrally-coordinated consumers, takes an agent-based approach. This 
model then naturally forms a basis for the probabilistic risk assessment of the consequences of 
parasitism – particularly the harm that arises from the counterfeiting of safety critical products such as 
pharmaceuticals. The intended contribution is to show how the resource-based view can be extended 
to reflect the fact that heterogeneous resource distribution is implicated in parasitism as much as 
competition, and to show how a model of the underlying mechanisms can support risk analysis. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm remains a long-standing theory of how firms survive 
under competition (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Although it has met with a number of criticisms 
(Priem and Butler, 2001; Lado et al, 2006; Kraaijenbrink et al, 2010, Arend and Lévesque, 2010; 
Arend, 2015; Bromiley and Rau, 2016) – for example the indeterminate nature of its concepts, and its 
2 
 
ambiguity about the source of resource value – it is still argued that ‘no other perspective has 
effectively challenged its centrality to the field’ (Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky, 2007). And 
studies such as Makadok’s (2001), Adner and Zemsky’s (2006) and Bendoly’s (2007), which provide 
analytical and computational models of the resource-based view, have given it a lot more precision.  
Yet it is a theory that has not dealt with the fact that within many firms’ ecologies there are 
not only competing conspecifics but also parasites – firms that engage in activities like counterfeiting, 
parasitically exploiting and undermining a legitimate firm’s reputational resources. These reputational 
resources are central to a firm’s viability for obvious reasons. Almost all goods and services are 
subject to strong information asymmetries (Akerlof, 1970) in which consumers typically know much 
less about the intrinsic quality of such goods and services than producers. This information 
asymmetry creates risks of producers providing poor quality, defective and even dangerous goods. 
Reputation thus becomes an important device for managing the risks to consumers – and therefore an 
important resource for producers competing for consumers’ business. It is a particularly significant 
resource in experience good markets, where the inadvertent consumption of poor quality products is 
more likely and opportunism therefore more significant (Liebeskind and Rumelt, 1989). Nonetheless, 
the reputational resource is vulnerable to exploitation by imposters: to counterfeiters passing off sub-
standard products as being those of a reputable producer. Institutions like trademark (Ramello, 2006) 
are attempts to mitigate the counterfeiting risk by establishing a legally-protected signal of identity. 
Yet safety-critical products such as pharmaceuticals can be counterfeited extensively and easily, with 
widespread consequences for public health (Liang, 2006; Jackson et al, 2012). This is particularly so 
in the developing world (Juillet and Vlasto, 2005; Cuomo and Mackey, 2014; Mackey et al, 2015), 
but by no means exclusively so, as indicated by the EU’s adoption of a falsified medicines directive in 
2011 (EU, 2011). This makes various provisions, for example, in relation to the pharmaceuticals 
supply chain. But it also specifically refers to devices that can facilitate verification of authenticity, 
and thus deals with the problem that general, reputational resources are insufficient to manage 
consumption risk and are themselves at risk. As well as reportedly being a growing problem in 
pharmaceutical supply chains (Pinho de Lima et al, 2018), for reasons ranging from globalization to 
the Internet, counterfeiting is similarly a widespread and growing concern in microelectronics supply 
chains (DiMase et al, 2016), with a US Senate inquiry (Senate, 2012) referring to ‘a flood of 
counterfeit electronic parts’ in the defence industry. 
 The premise of this article is that phenomena like counterfeiting are not incidental to 
competition but are bound up with a firm’s attempts to be competitive, and therefore should be part of 
the resource-based theory of the firm. As in many ecologies, an entity that is successful in competition 
with its conspecifics becomes attractive to parasites that can draw on the benefits of a host’s success. 
The resource-based view is incomplete as a theory of firm survival if it does not deal with parasitism 
– and may give incomplete if not contradictory indications of a firm’s prospects. As argued below, for 
example, the inimitability criterion (Barney, 1991) for a competitive resource does not protect against 
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parasites, and in fact attracts them, because they make no attempt to imitate the reputational resource, 
instead appropriating and exploiting it by impersonation. 
 A considerable problem in the study of parasitic processes like counterfeiting has been the 
lack of credible data (Wilson et al, 2016). Not only is the activity itself clandestine, but reporting 
counterfeits can undermine the reputational resource of genuine producers. This absence of empirical 
knowledge makes it especially important to develop our understanding by modelling: by expressing 
what we believe to be the mechanisms underlying counterfeiting, and by exploring the outcomes 
created by them. In the absence of empirical data it also becomes the main coherent support for 
decision makers, both those in public agencies concerned with regulation and public health, and those 
within firms specifically concerned about dangerous counterfeits of their products. Epstein (2008) 
offers a wide variety of reasons for modelling of this kind, well beyond these considerations – but 
these include the training of practitioners and disciplining the policy dialogue. He also makes the key 
point that ‘Without models... it is not always clear what data to collect’. Smith and Rand (2018) 
similarly advocate agent-based modelling in order inter alia to develop theory for subsequent 
empirical exploration. 
Agent-based modelling is particularly indicated in this case because the reputational resource, 
although notionally belonging to a firm, exists primarily as beliefs in the minds of a distributed and 
heterogeneous population of consumers. Representing their interactions and consumption decisions is 
most directly achieved with an agent-based model. This also offers what has been characterized as a 
‘demand-side’ perspective (Adner and Zemsky, 2006; Chauradia et al, 2018) on the resource-based 
view: resource value is created for the consumer (before being captured by the firm) because 
reputation manages consumer risk and informs consumer choice. 
The aim of this article is therefore to explore, through agent-based modelling, 1) how we 
should extend the resource-based view in order to be a satisfactory theory of a firm existing in an 
ecology of both competitors and counterfeiters, and 2) how a model of the mechanisms through which 
competition and counterfeiting evolve can form a basis for assessing the risks arising from 
counterfeiting in the case of products such as pharmaceuticals. In the remainder of the article there is 
an account of how the resource-based view can be extended in this way, followed by the development 
of an agent-based model, and an account of how simulation yields insights about the kind of risks that 




2. The relevant literature and the need for a theory of parasitism 
 
2.1 The resource-based view and the missing account of parasitism 
The central focus of the resource based view of the firm is on competition, and the heterogeneous 
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endowment of bundles of persistent resources that confer competitive advantage due to their valuable, 
rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable characteristics (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 2016). It is 
an attractively general theory that has been taken up in a variety of disciplines (for recent examples 
see Hitt et al, 2016; Kull et al, 2016), although not always approvingly (Bromiley and Rau, 2016). 
The resource at issue in counterfeiting is a producer’s reputation for quality: for reliable, durable, safe 
goods that are free from contaminants, by-products and defects. Reputation is regarded as ‘a key 
resource’ (Scott and Walsham, 2005), the outcome of a long-term process of development and so 
among the hardest of all resources to imitate (Roberts and Dowling, 2002). It is thus a classically 
heterogeneous resource that is central to a firm’s competitiveness. It also has path dependence, arising 
from a succession of products, claims and consumption experiences. It has causal ambiguity, 
producing competitive advantage through subjective, contingent routes. And it is socially complex, 
requiring a coherent effort over multiple specialized actors to build and maintain (Barney, 1999; 
Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). Reputational resources are what shape 
external actors’ responses to the firm given the inevitable discrepancy between ‘what is known inside 
the firm and what is known externally’ (Teece at al, 1997).  
 Inimitability is sometimes regarded as the most important aspect of resource-based theory. 
There are many ways of obtaining inimitability (Newbert, 2007), and the reputational resource is 
inherently inimitable because it specifically concerns the identity of its holder, creating a clear 
resource barrier against competitors (Wernerfelt, 1984) who are new, untried or in some way 
discredited. Yet the counterfeiter circumvents this inimitability. It does not imitate the reputational 
resource, but imitates the host’s products and imitates devices proving their authenticity (like 
trademark, and third party certification) in order to impersonate the host. It thus avoids the need for 
what Teece et al (1997) refer to as ‘replication’ – the transfer of resources from one economic setting 
to another. There is a natural isolating mechanism (Rumelt, 1984) inherent in reputation as a resource: 
it has a uniqueness that comes from a lengthy process of demonstrating capability. But this isolating 
mechanism is bypassed in the counterfeiter’s strategy of being an imposter and thus appropriating but 
not imitating reputation. This means that the inimitability of the target firm’s reputational resource, far 
from being a barrier, in fact becomes an attraction to the counterfeiter. 
 This process is closely analogous to that of biological parasitism. As in most cases of 
biological parasitism, counterfeiting depletes the host resource it exploits and can thus become self-
limiting. If counterfeits penetrate the market to too great a degree this will destroy the value of the 
host’s reputational resource and the parasite will itself fail unless it finds another host. As with other 
parasitic processes, it also creates harmful by-products such as physical danger and loss. And the 
relationship between host and parasite differs radically from that between host and competitors. 
Advertising and promotion by the legitimate producer are not usually beneficial to its competitors yet 
are usually beneficial to the parasite (Mackenzie, 2010), for example. A host signaling its strengths to 
deter competitors or entice consumers attracts parasites, as will the measures a host takes to protect its 
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reputation. It is even possible that, if counterfeiters operate exclusively in markets not already 
exploited by the legitimate producer, the parasitic relationship can become symbiotic (Lahiri and Day, 
2013). 
Perhaps the closest the RBV literature has come to parasitism is work on how one firm can 
gain access to another’s resources through inter-firm linkages (Lavie, 2006; Hitt et al, 2016) and how, 
at the same time, this can also facilitate access by competitors (Mesquita et al, 2008; Hitt et al, 2016; 
Chauradia et al, 2018). This is connected to recent work challenging the view that resources have to 
be controlled in order to secure competitive advantage (Alexy et al, 2018). Both issues are especially 
interesting in the case of reputational resources – where the possibilities of legitimately appropriating 
value from an associated organization’s reputation, and the difficulties of maintaining control, can be 
central issues for a firm. They are also issues that are likely to be regarded with ambivalence, holding 
out the possibilities of both enhancing and undermining competitive advantage. Thus a more nuanced 
understanding of the RBV has emerged – in which control may not be central to competitive 
advantage, and relationships among firms may confer access to others’ resources. But there is still a 
need for a substantial step further: to deal with the general problem of parasitism on valuable  
resources and the emergence of parasites as a group distinct from a firm’s competing conspecifics. 
The issue of resource control is also strongly influenced by the fact that, although reputation 
belongs as a resource to a producer, it really exists as a state of consumers’ minds. It is the kind of 
resource that the resource-based literature sometimes refers to as being subjective (Kor et al, 2007). It 
is in various senses owned by the producer, but it exists in the minds of others, and those others are 
reasoning, adaptive agents – not passive repositories. Moreover, these consumers are heterogeneous, 
holding non-identical views of the producer, yet at the same time influencing each other. We know 
from empirical studies such as those of Scherer and Cho (2003) and subsequently Muter et al (2013) 
that there are strong social contagion effects in which dyadic ties between individual risk perceivers 
have a strong influence on their perceptions of risks such as those of poor product quality. Ultimately, 
then, the extension of the resource-based view from competition to competition plus parasitism does 
not just involve taking account of behaviour in a group of parasites – but must also deal with the inter-
related behaviour in a population of consumers. This also becomes an important consideration for the 
choice of modelling medium. 
 
2.2 The case for agent-based modelling in representing parasitism 
Existing models of product counterfeiting are based on a traditional normative approach of utility 
maximization among consumers without reference to the resource-based view. They generally refer 
back to two seminal articles by Grossman and Shapiro (1988a, 1988b). Several studies, including 
Grossman and Shapiro’s (1988b) second, are specifically concerned with what they refer to as ‘non-
deceptive’ counterfeiting. Given the WTO (2011) definition of counterfeiting as ‘deceiving the 
purchaser into believing that he/she is buying the original goods’, these really produce models of 
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competition not counterfeiting. Qian et al’s (2015) model allows ‘non-deceptive counterfeiting’, as 
does Zhang et al’s (2012) and Cho et al’s (2015). Models such as Cho et al’s (2015) also equate the 
perceived quality of a product with its ‘real quality’, thereby assuming away the obvious information 
asymmetry that lies behind the value of reputation as a resource. The whole problem is that consumers 
cannot ‘perceive’ the objective quality of what they might choose to consume. There is also a closely 
related literature that specifically models the ‘piracy’ of information goods, and Lahiri and Dey’s 
(2013) study provides a recent example and summary of this literature. But again this typically lacks 
the defining element of deception. Moreover the emphasis of existing models is on equilibria of one 
kind or another, both economic (Grossman and Shapiro, 1988a) and game theoretic (Qian et al, 2015; 
Cho et al, 2015) – not on the dynamics of a process or on the normal choice processes of actors faced 
with bounded rationality. It is the dynamics of counterfeiting processes that producers and other actors 
actually experience, and that produce the risk of consuming harmful goods. 
To extend resource-based theory what is needed is a model of firms interacting over time 
through processes of competition and parasitism, responding to the dynamics of those processes as 
they experience them, and having decision rules whose simplicity and transparency reflect bounded 
rationality and the need for ecological validity (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). At the end of Section 
2.1 an argument was also made that reputational resources, although belonging to a producer, exist 
more directly in the minds of a population of distributed, heterogeneous consumers who interact 
among themselves as well as with producers and counterfeiters. All this suggests a need for agent-
based modelling, which is especially indicated when multiple actors interact without central 
coordination (Macy and Willer, 2002), following rules whose collective effects are hard to deduce 
(Axelrod,1997: 4), and having a diversity of qualities that shape the behaviour of the system (Macal 
and North, 2010). It is suited to problems such as understanding resource allocation processes that are 
hard to study empirically (Coen and Maritan, 2011). And it has been particularly linked by 
sociologists to the process-theoretic tradition in social theory (Cederman, 2005). As Miller (2015) 
argues, ‘Specifying agent-based models promotes ontological clarity by focusing researchers’ 
attention on the properties and relations of people and things, and their dynamics’. This concern with 
dynamics is not the exclusive preserve of agent-based modelling, and systems dynamics is an 
alternative medium that has been used to model the RBV in particular (Rahmandad, 2012). Like 
agent-based approaches, systems dynamics produces computational, ‘complex system’ models 
(Carley, 2009; Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008). But the distinguishing feature of agent-based models 
is that they offer a direct representation of agents, like firms, consumers and counterfeiters, and the 
social networks in which they interact. This is an important quality of Bendoly’s (2007) 
computational model of mutual resource enablement in the resource-based view, for example, and of 
Amini et al’s (2012) model of product diffusion. Agents like consumers can be depicted as being as 
heterogeneous as suits the context (Stummer et al, 2015). In contrast, Adner and Zemsky’s (2006) 
analytical model of the resource-based view represents consumer heterogeneity with only two classes 
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of consumer and does not deal with the interactions among them. Moreover, the direct representation 
of agents means that agent-based models offer the clearest way of portraying the agents’ bounded 
rationality (Stummer et al, 2015), and the naturally heuristic nature of human responses to uncertainty 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996).  
Since reputation essentially concerns the way in which consumers manage their consumption 
risk, the most relevant recent developments in the ABM literature are those dealing with the way in 
which collective risk responses develop as individuals exchange risk signals. Recent work using agent 
based models to develop insight into collective risk responses includes studies on social risk 
amplification (Busby et al, 2016), the dissemination of risk warnings (Nagarajan et al, 2012), and how 
collective risk responses shape the underlying risk they are responding to (Tonn and Guikema, 2018). 
The key issue in this kind of work is the recursive connection between risk perceptions and objective 
risk, mediated by the social interaction of the risk perceivers. Different studies in this area have 
modelled this interaction in different ways: Busby et al’s model (2016), for example, was based on 
individuals responding through availability heuristics. But they share the basic setup in which some 
kind of focal, organizational agent – or group of agents –  is trying to manage the way a distributed 
group of other agents responds to signals it receives about failure or disruption in the focal 
organization’s capacities. As with the problem of parasitism and counterfeiting, the underlying 
phenomenon, whether it is some physical disaster, a disease outbreak or some economic threat, only 
becomes a threat to an organization when it is a threat to some other population and becomes the 
object of that population’s attention. The organization’s central concern is then the dynamics of this 
population’s response over time. 
An agent-based model is therefore developed in the next section in order to explore how the 
resource-based view should be extended to deal with parasitism, and counterfeiting in particular. An 
‘agent’ in this model is always a social entity: a human or organization, equipped with behavioural 
capacities that define the mechanism (Miller, 2015) which produces and modifies reputations. It is 
this direct representation of social entities that makes agent modelling especially well-suited to 
theories like the RBV whose concern is with the advantage of a particular firm in relation to other 
firms within some common group. A ‘resource’, in contrast, is conventionally a stock or supply of 
some kind whose use provides benefit to some agent. This creates a risk of tautology in the RBV 
(Priem and Butler, 2001; Arend, 2015)), because a resource defined by being beneficial is theorised to 
be the cause of a beneficial outcome. But, in the model that follows, a reputational resource is only a 
resource in the sense that it participates in various agents’ decision rules. 
 
 
3. Developing a model of reputation, competition and parasitism 
 
3.1 The starting point: producers, consumers and reputation 
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The aim of the model that follows is to explore how to represent a resource-based theory extended to 
deal with parasitism co-evolving with competition. At various points this uses the context of 
pharmaceuticals as a motivating example, but avoids where possible idiosyncratic aspects of 
pharmaceuticals that are irrelevant to other cases. As acknowledged later, models that inform practice 
are ways of addressing idiosyncrasy as much as they are ways of addressing general processes of 
competition and parasitism – but the concern here is with these general processes. 
The basis of the model is a small set of legitimate producers, p  P, who produce a product 
that is functionally the same but can have systematic quality differences. A producer p’s reputational 
resource is central to the model, but this exists in the scalar evaluations of individuals within a 
population of consumers c  C, as rcp  [0, 1]. These evaluations rcp are initially endowed with values 
sampled from a beta distribution, rcp(t = 0) = Beta[, ] whose parameters are model constants. The 
aggregate reputation for p is the sum of these:   
rp c  C rcp  
This naturally makes the reputational resource socially complex and path dependent, following the 
specific processes – outlined below – by which the rcp(t ) distributed over the consumer population 
evolve. This is a substantially different approach from that of more analytical models such as Cabral’s 
(2016) in which reputation is represented as a function, directly, of prior reputation and quality. 
 Whenever a consumer c is active, it updates its reputational evaluation of p in the light of its 
neighbours’ evaluations. As Amini et al (2012) argue, neglecting this local interaction or ‘word of 
mouth’ process in the consuming population leads to poor policy conclusions. Consumers are 
embedded in some social network represented by an unweighted graph G where c and d are 
neighbours if Gcd = 1, and not if Gcd  = 0. The immediate neighbourhood of c is N(c) = {d  C | Gcd = 
1}. The simplest rule for updating its reputational evaluation of producer p is that c takes a weighted 
mean of its own and its neighbours’ evaluations in the prior period. All neighbours’ evaluations are 
given equal weight and, despite the obvious limitations of this procedure, the validity of equal 
weighting or ‘tallying’ has been shown to be surprisingly strong (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). It is 
straightforward to incorporate refinements – for example Amini et al (2012) argue that negative word-
of-mouth has a greater effect than positive, and Stummer et al (2015) similarly suggest that consumers 
are more likely to communicate information that reduces utility valuations. The relative importance of 
its neighbours’ views is based on the consumer’s credulity (that is, open-ness to influence by others’ 
opinions), yc, such that  
rcp(t) = (1 – yc)rcp(t – 1) + ycd N(c) rdp(t – 1) / | N(c) | 
All models of this kind need some representation of credulity although it often goes by different 
labels: Amini et al (2012) for example refer to a ‘coefficient of imitation’. The values of yc  [0, 1] 
are randomly endowed from a uniform distribution and do not change. There is thus a diffusion 
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process in the social network, but it is a diffusion process that co-exists with an experiential process, 
as explained below. The model excludes the possibility that reputational evaluations would also be 
influenced by broadcast news events, but could readily be extended to incorporate such events. It is 
also worth saying that, although a model in which interaction solely consists of this exchange of 
reputational evaluations appears very limited, it has some justification. Moussaid et al’s (2015) 
study suggested that specific messages become distorted as they are diffused through chains 
of inter-individual interaction, but that the perception of risk is transmitted more faithfully 
because individuals shape their messages accordingly. 
 When it is active at any time t, a producer p sets a price qp  [0, 1] that is a weighted mean of 
prior price and reputation, qp(t) = wp,t qp(t – 1) + (1 - wp,t) rp(t – 1), where wp,t is randomly sampled 
from a uniform distribution at t and prices are randomly endowed at t = 0. Thus prices have inertia but 
follow reputation. In practice there are many other possibilities for producers’ price updating rules, 
and evidence on just how prices behave depends very much on context. See for example Weiss 
(2006). A consumer c, when active at t, makes a choice of one producer kc  P. This choice is based 
on its own reputational evaluation rcp of p, and the product price qp. It is important to make the choice 
stochastic as there are clearly other factors that shape consumer decisions. So the model represents c 
as choosing p randomly with a probability proportional to the reputation-to-price quotient. Thus the 
choice kc is sampled from a distribution over the producers where 
Prob[kc = p] = (rcp / qp) /  P (rc / q) 
Use of a stochastic decision rule allows for mistakes, as well as the unspecified effect of other 
influences on the choice. Wood et al (2016)  similarly use probabilistic rules of behaviour in their 
analysis, but Stummer et al (2015) specify deterministic rules with a random error term to allow for 
mistakes. The central role played by reputation in this simple decision rule reflects its risk-managing 
function for the consumer, outlined earlier. Once consumers have chosen a producer they do not 
necessarily consume, as it might be that counterfeiting has become so rife that even the most attractive 
producer still presents an unacceptable risk. So consumer c makes a stochastic decision to consume or 
not, lc  {0, 1}. It is unlikely a pharmaceutical consumer would stop consuming unless its reputational 
evaluation had become very poor, so the consumption probability is set to a highly concave function 
of rcp. But this assumption is tentative and really needs empirical investigation in any given context:  
Prob[lc = 1 | kc = p] = rcp0.2 
Either a consumer consumes one unit of product or nothing at whatever time it is active. This 
produces a consumer base for p as Z(p) = {c C | kc = p ∩ lc = 1} and a demand for its products as zp = 
| Z(p) |. The assumption, like Adner and Zemsky’s (2006), is that within the limits of the situations 
produced by the model there are no capacity constraints on the firm. A producer’s competitiveness is 
defined by the demand zp, but this demand might be partly met by counterfeits. The producer’s 
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revenues are thus not determined by reputation through a direct functional connection, as they are in 
Cabral’s (2016) model, but emerge from a process of reputation-shaped consumption choices. 
 
3.2 Counterfeiters and the consumption of counterfeits 
There is a small set of counterfeiters, f  F, who individually choose which producer p to target 
according to an attractiveness based on producers’ reputations, rp, and prices qp. It is thus assumed that 
counterfeiters can estimate a producer’s net reputation. For counterfeiters, as for consumers, high 
reputation is attractive – as suggested above. But, unlike for consumers, so is high price. Therefore the 
counterfeiter f makes a choice of one producer to target, uf  P, such that the probability of choosing p 
is proportional to the product of the producer’s total reputation and price: 
Prob[uf  = p] = rpqp / P rq 
It is assumed the counterfeiters face equal costs, irrespective of their target. For the purposes of 
developing a model specifically of the role of reputational resources, counterfeiters’ cost structures are 
ignored. But in reality these can be complex, and complexly related to potential payoffs. Specific 
aspects of supply chain structure and differences in jurisdiction along supply chains also plainly 
make a difference to costs (especially penalties and risks). 
 Having chosen the target, the counterfeiter also chooses a level at which to counterfeit, as 
some fraction ef  [0, 1] of the legitimate producer’s production level. The choice of ef is strongly 
related to price, since the higher the price the greater the potential revenue for the counterfeiter and 
the more tolerable the risks. In this simple model the two are simply equated, since prices lie in [0, 1]. 
Thus if uf  = p then ef = qp. It is assumed that counterfeiters charge the same price as the genuine 
product, in order to avoid signalling that their products might be counterfeits. 
 The proportion of products available that appear to be those of p, but are actually counterfeits, 
at any one time will be 
bp = f  F | u(f) = p ef  / (1 + f  F | u(f) = p ef) 
This is also the probability that a consumer c who has chosen to consume producer p’s product will 
inadvertently consume a counterfeit. So the actual experience xc  {0, 1} of c consuming a counterfeit 
at any time t at which c is active occurs at random according to 
 Prob[xc(t) = 1 | kc = p] = bp 
An important assumption is that the product is neither a ‘search’ good (Nelson, 1970) whose quality is 
completely evident before it is chosen, nor a ‘credence’ good (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006) whose 
quality is not known even when consumed. Instead it is an ‘experience’ good whose quality becomes 
evident when consumed. In Qian et al’s (2015) study a given product has both searchable and 
experiential qualities (for example appearance and functionality). To keep the model parsimonious, 
however, here a consumer c consuming producer p’s product detects if it is counterfeit immediately 
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after consumption. The assumption is also made that the consumer does not choose to knowingly 
consume a counterfeit. There are obviously markets in which counterfeits are consumed intentionally 
for a variety of reasons (Cordell et al, 1996; Veloutsou and Bian, 2008; Chaudhry and Stumpf, 2011). 
These tend not to be markets for safety critical products, but this is not necessarily the case. 
 On detecting a counterfeit, consumers revise their reputational evaluations. Loewenstein and 
Mather (1990) find evidence for a ‘surprise’ effect, suggesting that when consumers encounter 
counterfeits, the adjustments to their reputational evaluations should be proportional to those 
evaluations. It is assumed that the proportionality constant is identical for all consumers, Mcounterfeit < 
1. If the consumer encounters a genuine item, there is a corresponding and much smaller adjustment 
in the opposite sense, Mgenuine << 1. So, for a consumer c active at time t, if kc = p (the consumer has 
chosen p) and xc(t) = 1 (the consumer has encountered a counterfeit) then 
 rcp(t  + 1) = rcp(t) – Mcounterfeit rcp(t) 
Otherwise, if xc(t) = 0, 
 rcp(t  + 1) = Min[rcp(t) +  Mgenuine rcp(t), 1] 
Asymmetry in the development of trust (for example Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004) and the 
reputational effect of surprises, central to Cabral’s (2016) study, indicates that Mcounterfeit >> Mgenuine. 
The consumer c experiencing consumption of a counterfeit also communicates with its immediate 
neighbours d in the social network, N(c), causing them also to re-evaluate p’s reputation by taking a 
weighted mean of their prior evaluations and c’s re-evaluation. The weight is again the consumers’ 
credulity, yd: 
  d  N(c): rdp (t + 1) = (1 – yd)rdp(t) + ydrcp(t  + 1) 
Figure 1 shows the main interactions among the agents defining the system at this stage, through these 
decision rules. The ‘←’ symbol, as in ‘y ← x’, indicates that x directly influences y through a decision 




















Figure 1. The initial interactions defining the agent-based model 
 
This analysis differs substantially from the more standard analysis of markets for experience goods 
under uncertainty. In Liebeskind and Rumelt’s (1989) analysis, the issue is whether a consumer’s 
experience of a poor-quality product can be blamed on the producer, or chance, because if the former 
then the consumer would boycott the producer. In the counterfeiting case there is an a priori 
uncertainty for the consumer about whether they have bought a counterfeit but, if they find out they 
have, then they may well switch if there is an alternative producer. There is no uncertainty about 
attribution at that point. 
 
3.3 Adding retaliation and deterrence 
Detection and prosecution or other counter-action are most dependent on the level of counterfeiting 
activity. Very low levels are unlikely to provoke either the legitimate producer or the authorities to 
take action. But this retaliation is stochastic as it depends on other factors, such as good intelligence 
about counterfeits through distributor networks, and its timing is uncertain. In the model each 
counterfeiter f is in a state of being retaliated against, vf  {0, 1}, and when the counterfeiter is active 
the probability that retaliation is initiated is proportional to the counterfeiter’s production level, ef, 
according to a constant V common to all producers: 
 Prob[vf (t ) = 1] = Vef(t) 
When retaliation is initiated,  f’s fractional production level ef is forced to zero for some period U. At 
all other times ef is set by the decision rule indicated above. U is a model constant and identical for all 
counterfeiters. The literature indicates that even technological responses, such as holographic 
marking, are only temporarily effective (Newton et al, 2006), but in specific contexts this effect can 
be made more complex – for example, reducing counterfeit availability by some declining fraction. 
Counterfeiters k 
Product target uf   
Counterfeiting level ef 
Producers p 
Total reputation rp 
Consumer demand zp 
Product price qp 




Evaluation of p’s reputation rcp 
Neighbourhood N(c) = {d | Gcd = 1} 
Product choice kc  
Consumption level lc  




rp ← rcp  
zp ← kc, lc  
 
rcp(t) ← rdp(t – 1) | d N(c) 
rcp(t) ← xc 
uf  ← rp, qp  
ef ← qp 
bp ← ef, uf 
 
kc ← qp 
xc ← bp 
 
 
qp ← rp 
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Another possibility is for a legitimate producer to deter rather than retaliate against 
counterfeits. This might involve enhancing the product’s intrinsic quality or protecting the distribution 
infrastructure – for example using tracking technology such as RFID (Cannon et al., 2008). Evidence 
about the effectiveness of such investments appears mixed, especially when they apply to the 
packaging rather than the product itself (Liang, 2006). Therefore, the model is extended such that a 
producer p, with some probability that is proportional to the extent to which its product is being 
counterfeited, either invests or not in anti-counterfeiting measures, as recorded by ip  {0, 1}: 
Prob[ip = 1] = Wbp 
The constant W is identical for all producers. The effect of the investment is to increase the producer’s 
price qp by some multiple, a model constant Q > 1, to Qqp, but also to create some deterrent to the 
counterfeiter, another model constant D > 1. These are related, in the sense that we would expect the 
more costly deterrents, with higher Q, to producer greater deterrence D, but the relationship is not 
determinate as producers will have a range of deterrents of varying cost effectiveness to choose from. 
How closely price reflects the producer’s extra cost is as usual highly context dependent, but in almost 
any realistic case deterrence will be costly to the producer, either directly or indirectly. The deterrent, 
in itself and independently of reputation, reduces the attractiveness of p as a target for the 
counterfeiters from rpqp  (as specified above) to rpqp/D, but the increase in price to Qqp raises this, to 
rpqpQ/D. So, modifying the earlier rule, the counterfeiter’s probability of choosing to counterfeit p is 
now: 
Prob[uf  = p] = (rpqpQ/D) / ((rpqpQ/D)+ P, i() = 0 rq+ P, i() = 1 rqQ/D). 
The treatment of retaliation and deterrence can be made much more complex than this, and both may 
also involve dealing with infringements of patents or copyright as well as trademark. The model as 
presented here deals specifically with counterfeiting – with the way a counterfeiter appropriates a 
legitimate firm’s reputation. It does not deal with infringement of patent or copyright, and the way in 
which a firm’s expertise is appropriated  (Stevenson and Busby, 2015). The two can  go together – 
where the counterfeiter copies a product’s patented function, for example. But it might not, and it is 
certainly conceivable that a pharmaceutical counterfeiter would copy the product’s appearance but not 
incorporate the active ingredient. The other problem with both deterrence and retaliation decisions is 
that they are essentially tactical responses that might be at odds with the legitimate producer’s longer-
term, strategic goals (for a recent study of this interaction see Hardcopf et al, 2017). Extending the 
model in this direction is beyond the scope of this article. But it is a reminder that actions taken in the 
short term to deal with parasitism can undermine longer term strategies to deal with competition. 
 
3.4 Adding recreancy and disclosure 
A further consideration is the conduct of the producers, in particular if and when they disclose the fact 
that their products are being counterfeited. On the one hand, disclosure may undermine reputation as 
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it conveys information that there is a non-zero probability a consumer will consume a counterfeit. On 
the other hand, a failure to disclose the presence of counterfeits, when a consumer makes the 
discovery through other channels, will also undermine reputation through loss of trust. The failure to 
disclose is perhaps the simplest and most obvious manifestation of recreancy (Freudenberg, 1993). 
The issues associated with disclosure in relation to pharmaceutical counterfeiting, specifically, are 
discussed in detail by Cockburn et al (2005). In the model, producer p discloses or not the fact that its 
products are being counterfeited, as recorded by yp  {0, 1}, with a probability equal to the extent of 
this counterfeiting, bp (from above):  
Prob[yp = 1] = bp 
The disclosure remains in existence unless and until p reverses this decision using the same rule. This 
decision rule is the same as that which triggers investment in anti-counterfeiting measures, described 
earlier, but both are stochastic so the decisions are not always in the same direction. Then, if a 
consumer c consumes a counterfeit and a disclosure from the relevant producer p is in force, i.e. if kc = 
p, xc(t) = 1 and yp = 1, the potential reputational damage described above is ameliorated by a model 
constant Y < 1 such that: 
 rcp(t  + 1) = Min[(1 + Y)(rcp(t) – Mcounterfeit rcp(t)), 1] 
Otherwise, if yp = 0 (there is no disclosure from the producer) then as before: 
 rcp(t  + 1) = rcp(t) – Mcounterfeit rcp(t) 
The effect is propagated, as with all the other effects on reputation, through the social network. So the 
disclosure decision affects consumption decisions, and thereby consumption risk, as discussed below. 
 
 
4. Using the model to assess risk 
 
4.1 A simulation of the model 
In this section the aim is to show, through simulation, how an agent-based model of this kind can 
produce insights into the outcomes generated by the mechanisms just specified – estimating uncertain, 
harmful outcomes in particular. The model was simulated in this instance for a simple system of three 
producers, two counterfeiters and 1 000 consumers, subsequently compared with somewhat larger 
group sizes. The consumers’ social network was based on Barabasi and Albert’s (1999) observation 
that most real networks exhibit preferential connectivity. Thus the network is generated by randomly 
linking pairs of nodes with a probability equal to the relative connectedness of those nodes, until the 
average link degree reaches some level L, a model parameter. Amini et al (2012), in contrast, use a 
random network structure without preferential attachment, whereas Stummer et al (2015) use a more 
complex algorithm producing small-world and scale-free properties that also incorporates 
geographical disposition. But, as indicated below, in this case the outcomes are relatively insensitive 
to network structure. The simulation period is divided into 5 000 discrete ‘ticks’. At periods of 5, 30 
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and 1 ticks, respectively, one of each type of agent (producer, counterfeiter and consumer) is selected 
at random, with equal probability, for activation and the decision rules applied. Consumption, and the 
experience of consuming a counterfeit, can only take place at the site of an activated consumer. There 
is no specific relation between simulation ticks and metric time, but these activation periods reflect 
the relative timescales in which the agents are assumed to operate. Counterfeiters, although they 
typically face vastly less work than legitimate producers in introducing a new product, nonetheless 
require a finite time to switch – for example in producing authentic packaging. The consumer 
switching decision is effectively instantaneous, and the producer decisions within the model scope 
(revised pricing) are also likely to be relatively quick. But these are assumptions about situations, and 
can obviously be adapted for situations that are believed to differ. The simulation is initialised with 
consumers’ credulities sampled from a beta distribution symmetrical over [0, 1], consumers’ 
reputational evaluations sampled from an asymmetric distribution (thus starting the simulation with 
producer reputations random but mostly intact), counterfeiters’ initial production levels set at zero, 
and producers’ initial prices also sampled from a symmetrical distribution. Model parameters were 
assigned minimum, modal and maximum values (indicated in the next sub-section) and sampled from 
beta distributions for each run of the simulation, written in Java under JDK1.7.0_7. Figure 2 illustrates 
the simulation schematically: agents are activated asynchronously and different agent types influence 





































Figure 2. A schematic representation of the simulation 
 
The primary public safety outcomes are take two forms: 1) the inadvertent consumption of counterfeit 
products, and 2) the consumption foregone by consumers as a result of counterfeit consumption risk. 
In the motivating example of counterfeit pharmaceuticals, the first is probably the most significant, 
leading to an exposure – for example – to counterfeit drugs that are contaminated or lack the active 
ingredient. The second has direct consequences for the producer, representing lost revenue, but in 
particular cases (most obviously those of medications) also creates a public safety risk from under-
consumption of protective or therapeutic products. In principle, the two outcomes, consumed 
counterfeits and foregone consumption, can be measured more directly as risks if it is possible to 
estimate the probability of a consumed counterfeit producing a fatality and, if the product is in some 
way protective, the probability of a fatality arising from consumption foregone. Such probabilities are 
entirely context-specific so there is little point in specifying them here, and the outcomes are therefore 




Random selection of 
consumer to activate 
Rule-based interaction 





Cycle at tP 
Producer population 
Random selection of 








product choice and  
consumption risk 
Counterfeiter population 
Random selection of 
counterfeiter to activate 
Rule-based choice of 
product to counterfeit 
Rule-based choice of 
counterfeit production 
level 
Cycle at tF 
Cycle at tC 
Producer prices, retaliation 
and deterrence 
Counterfeiter target and 
production level 
Consumer choice, 
consumption and evaluation 
17 
 
Figure 3 shows traces of dynamic model behavior over time in a single run for the baseline 
group sizes (three producers, two counterfeiters and 1 000 consumers). These indicate for the two 
kinds of harm both the cumulative level of harm and a short-term probability over the previous period 
of 100 model ticks. The two kinds of risk both fluctuate, but it is clear that the foregone consumption 
risk follows a rising trend, whereas the counterfeit consumption risk (the darker line of the two) does 
not but cycles more strongly. The model ignores all pipeline effects within whatever distribution 







Figure 3. Traces from a single simulation run of short-term risk and accumulated harm 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the trajectories of the three producers’ reputations and demand levels, drawn in light 
grey to black as they develop over time. All producers start with similar, high levels of reputation but 
this declines steadily over time. They start with different levels of demand, but these converge 
markedly. Two producers experience rapid falls in demand, but one experiences increasing demand 
even as its reputation declines in the early part of the simulation period. On face value parasitism is 
self-limiting, in the sense that the parasite undermines the resource it exploits – its host’s reputation. 
But in a competitive market, when a counterfeiter has undermined a producer’s reputation to the point 
where it is a less attractive target than the original target’s competitors, the counterfeiter can switch to 
a competitor as target. No attempt has been made to model this switching cost to counterfeiters, but 
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Figure 4. Trajectories of individual producer reputation and demand 
 
 
4.2 Risk and sensitivity 
In a risk model, unlike most simulations of the RBV such as Bendoly’s (2007), the aim is not to 
discover general patterns across multiple parameterisations but to discover the behaviours of the 
significant outcomes – notably the ones that create harm – in a given context. The context is defined 
by a particular parameterisation, as in Stummer et al’s (2015) agent-based model of product diffusion, 
subject to uncertainty in parameter values. Ford and Flynn’s (2005) suggestion for assessing 
sensitivity to this parameterisation is to use the Pearson correlation coefficient between outcome 
variables and model parameters. There is a range of alternative methods for this kind of sensitivity 
analysis, from partial correlation coefficients (Helton and Davis, 2000), through variance-based 
approaches (Saltelli, 2002) to more active search-based processes (Miller, 1998). But scatter plots 
look straightforwardly linear, so Table 1 presents the correlation coefficients between the two risk-
relevant outcomes and the parameters of the model, based on a series of 1 000 runs of the simulation 
specified earlier, for the baseline population and two larger populations (5, 2 and 1 000, then 10, 3 and 
2 000 producers, counterfeiters and consumers), labelled PS1, PS2 and PS3. 
 
























Table 1. Product moment correlations between outcomes and parameters 
 







   PS1 PS2 PS3 PS1 PS2 PS3 
L Network link mean degree 5, 10, 15 -0.07 -0.09 0.04 0.33 0.41 0.38 
Mcft Counterfeit reputational loss 0.7, 0.9, 0.99 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.16 0.16 0.06 
Y Disclosure ameliorator 0.05, 0.1, 0.2 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 
Mgen Genuine reputational gain 0.005, 0.01, 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
U Retaliation period 50, 100, 200 -0.39 -0.31 -0.26 -0.32 -0.25 -0.17 
V Retaliation trigger multiplier 0.1, 0.5, 1.0 -0.81 -0.85 -0.88 -0.73 -0.74 -0.68 
Q Deterrence price multiplier 1.0, 1.5, 2.0 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 
D Deterrence increment multiplier 0.2, 0.5, 0.9 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.03 
W Deterrence trigger multiplier  0.05, 0.1, 0.2 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
 
The most striking point is the general insensitivity of both outcomes to most of the model parameters 
– indicating that stochastic decision rules, random endowments of belief and attitude, and randomness 
in activation of consumers, all combine to make outcomes highly uncertain. The density of the 
consumer social network has no appreciable influence on consumed counterfeits, although some 
influence on foregone consumption. Insensitivity to network structure has been observed in other 
studies (Lee et al, 2013; Smith and Rand, 2018). The parameters determining reputational losses and 
gains from experiencing (or not) the consumption of counterfeits have surprisingly little influence, 
and again the influence is more on foregone consumption than on counterfeits consumed, although 
this is only significant for the loss and not the gain. It might be expected that the greater the 
reputational decrement to the experience of counterfeiting, the more consumers would be dissuaded 
from consumption and so the lower the overall number of counterfeits consumed. But this ignores the 
possibility of switching, both by consumers over short timescales and by counterfeiters over 
somewhat longer timescales. In terms of parameters expressing the effectiveness of producer 
responses to counterfeiting, there is a reasonably strong influence of a high probability of retaliation 
and a short retaliation period. But deterrence parameters have little influence on both outcomes. As 
suggested earlier, the problem for the producer is that deterrence reduces the attraction of that 
producer as a target for counterfeiters, but if it also increases the price of the protected product there is 
a countervailing increase in the attractiveness of that product for counterfeiting. And there is the 
switching issue: counterfeiters may switch to other producers if the deterrent works, but as they 
eventually undermine the reputation of those other producers it becomes increasingly attractive to 
switch back. 
 To assess risk more globally it is convenient to use a quantile-based measure resembling 
Value at Risk as a simple index of the risk implied in frequency distributions over total counterfeit 
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consumption and foregone consumption. Both outcomes in this case are harms rather than wealth, so 
it makes sense to deal with the upper not lower tails of the outcome distributions, for example the 
95% quantile. The corresponding Conditional Value at Risk, which ‘better captures the extreme tails’ 
(MacKenzie, 2014), is the expected value of outcomes in the tail beyond the value at risk. Because we 
are dealing with harms this index would be better termed ‘conditional loss potential’, CLP0.95. A 
simulation of 1 000 runs, with model parameters sampled as indicated in the previous paragraph, 
produces CLP0.95 values of 487, 520 and 311 (for counterfeits consumed) and 1 016, 770 and 340 (for 
consumption foregone) for the three population sizes conditioned on the parameters taking their 
modal values. This says something like an expected outcome given a near worst-case scenario is that 
487 counterfeits will be consumed and 1 016 normal cases of consumption will be foregone, in the 
smaller population (PS1) model. To indicate the effect of parameter uncertainties on this, Figure 5 
shows the fractional uplift in CLP0.95 from these values, first for all parameters being allowed to vary 
over their ranges as indicated in Table 1, and then for each parameter individually allowed to vary 
with all others fixed at their modal values. Parameter uncertainty increases CLP0.95 by between 11 and 
30% beyond the randomness inherent in the decision rules. As with the correlation-based sensitivity of 
the two types of harm, it is the retaliation trigger that dominates the effects – although for the 







Figure 5. Fractional uplift given parameter uncertainty in CLP0.95 over counterfeits consumed (left 
hand panel) and consumption foregone (right hand panel)  
 
As pointed out by one of the reviewers of this article, there are other important risks arising from 
counterfeiting. The reviewer mentions in particular the way in which counterfeits can overwhelm any 
attempt by low-cost but legitimate producers to enter a market. To deal with this, the model would 
need to be developed in such a way as to endogenise the firms’ cost structures, especially the 
counterfeiters’. In markets such as pharmaceuticals, counterfeiters and generics manufacturers are 
likely to have vastly lower costs than legitimate producers, given product development and trialling 
costs. This has not been modelled here, in order to maintain a focus on the basic parasitic process. But 
it is a promising line of development. It is connected to the observation that impoverished consumers 
may consume counterfeit medicines knowingly, when it is only counterfeits that are affordable to 
them. If counterfeits drive out legitimate low-cost producers the reputational mechanism becomes 
much weaker: consumers who consume knowing that a product carrying a reputable trademark might 
be a counterfeit are obviously relying much less on that trademark to manage their consumption risk. 








counterfeiting, indicating that some of the resource they could be devoting to legitimate low cost 
manufacture is instead being used to produce counterfeits. 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion  
 
5.1 Insights provided by the model 
The main reason for modelling in this case is to make an extension of the RBV coherent by 
developing what Bunge (1997) calls a ‘mechanismic’ model. The resource-based theory of 
counterfeiting is not a static correlation between the value of the reputational resource and the degree 
of counterfeit penetration but a co-evolution over time of counterfeit penetration and the competitive 
fortunes of the targeted producers. This approach is consistent with a shift of social theorizing from 
‘nomothetic to generative explanations’ and ‘variable-based to configurative ontologies’ (Cederman, 
2005). And it enables an analysis that neither has to assume consumers share no information with 
each other, nor has to assume they fully pool their experience (Liebeskind and Rumelt, 1989). This 
contrasts with models of the resource-based view such as Makadok’s (2001) – which treats all actors 
other than two competing firms as exogenous influences, modelling the value of a resource as a 
single, aggregate variable not as the operation of a complex process. And it contrasts with Adner and 
Zemsky’s (2006) approach, which represents resource value as some functional expression of what 
consumers get from some product improvement – instead of depicting how this value is realised in the 
mechanisms through which the consumer’s reputational evaluation affects their choice to consume. 
 The model also helps to explore the consequences of making the necessary assumptions. In 
this case, the two primary, direct measures of harm due to parasitism are the cumulative numbers of 
counterfeits consumed and the cumulative consumption foregone. These measures are correlated but 
not deterministically related so it is possible, if unusual, to experience high levels of foregone 
consumption when counterfeit penetration has been low. And the two kinds of harm have different 
dynamics – one cycling strongly, one cycling less strongly with a pronounced growth over time. 
Moreover, although parasitism is self-limiting, counterfeiters can switch between producers as hosts, 
probably at low cost, so perpetuating a general reputational decline in a market in the absence of other 
actions. Similarly, the possibility that consumers switch, as producer reputations change due to 
parasitism, means that the consumption of counterfeits is insensitive to how much a consumer’s 
experience of counterfeiting damages the targeted producer’s reputation. It is similarly insensitive to 
processes of deterrence undertaken by producers individually. These are potentially important limits 
to how far consumers and producers can control the associated risk. 
A third, collateral benefit to modelling is being able to identify connections and parallels with 
other lines of work. Credit is due to one of the anonymous reviewers for the insight that there is a 
close connection between parasitism and free-riding, both inter- and intra-organizational, as found in 
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attempts at group collaboration – and characteristically modelled with game theory (Al-Dhanhani et 
al, 2014). This shows how collaboration is impeded in various ways by behaviour that appears to be 
parasitic – in the sense that one entity (individual or organizational) exploits a resource properly 
belonging to another, or fails to share collaboratively useful informational resources (Bendoly, 2014). 
It is a reminder that various resources – reputational, informational and other – are not just exploited 
by impersonation, as in counterfeiting, but also, more weakly but still successfully, by association. An 
example in supply chain operations is provided by Rokkan and Buvik’s (2003) study. 
 
5.2 The relationship with the prior resource-based view 
One of the main issues in the RBV literature is that of resource erosion (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
Bendoly (2007) refers simply to a ‘natural depreciation’ of resources and, in Rahmandad’s (2012) 
model of capability development, erosion is represented by a basic mathematical function. Adner and 
Zemsky (2006) suggested that how resource value evolves over time generally is ‘largely 
unexplored’. But in this study the erosive process is central to the model and the theory it illustrates. 
Erosion is not the operation of an analytical function: it is the product of a complex interaction among 
producers, consumers and counterfeiting. It is endogenous to a system of interacting actors, and this 
helps show how erosion arises from the joint operation of all these actors’ decision rules. 
Another connection with prior work is that this study reiterates Ahuja and Katila’s (2004) 
observation on the evolutionary emergence of resources in a process of adapting to idiosyncratic 
circumstances. The context is very different from Ahuja and Katila’s (2004). But it similarly makes 
the point that resource heterogeneity – in this case variation in reputational resource – is a product of a 
firm co-evolving with an ecology, and at any given time the ecology is itself a product of the prior co-
evolution. This ecology is highly idiosyncratic, being strongly shaped by a sequence of random 
conditions. Yet, at the same time, and as Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) emphasize, there is 
commonality as well as idiosyncrasy in the conditions experienced by different firms. The parasitism 
experienced by one firm is readily transferred to its conspecifics as the model develops over time. 
And the reputational resource, although instantaneously heterogeneous and following unique 
trajectories across the producers, is shaped by a common generative process. 
It is worth observing that parasitism does not change the way the classical resource-based 
view of legitimate competition works: it co-exists with it and changes its outcomes, but the 
instrumental properties of a resource – its inimitability, rarity, non-substitutability and value – remain: 
1. The inimitability of a producer’s quality reputation is inherent in the model in the sense that a 
competitor cannot copy or acquire it as though it were available for sale in some factor market.  
Reputation is directed to a firm uniquely, and rises or falls according to consumer beliefs and 
experience. Counterfeiters do not try to imitate this reputational resource: they exploit it by 
impersonating the host, imitating the host’s products (not its resources) and using its trademark. 
Heterogeneity of reputation thus remains a basis of competition among legitimate producers.  
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2. As far as rarity is concerned, a firm’s reputation is unique. It may happen to have the same level 
of reputation as a competitor as a result of its historical development, but its reputation is its 
reputation alone. In the real world there is more complexity, and it may be that a firm’s 
reputation is really a whole industry’s reputation that is attributed to a specific firm. In some 
sense this is an internalization of resources that belong outside the firm (Bendoly, 2007; Dyer 
and Singh, 1998). It may also be that a competitor receives some reflected benefit from a firm’s 
reputation if consumers assume a competitor is likely to achieve the same kind of quality level. 
But this does not alter the competitive benefit of whatever rarity is achieved in practice . 
3. The property of non-substitutability arises in the model because consumers always choose by 
reputation, given its summarising value (Teece et al, 1997). There is no possible substitute for 
reputation: when it is diminished producers cannot produce the same kind of value in some 
other way. Again in reality there are some complexities that do not figure in the model. In 
industries such as pharmaceuticals, firms that lack a specific quality reputation can partly 
substitute for this with the reputation of regulatory authorities, giving consumers the confidence 
to consume the products of unknown firms if they trade through reasonably transparent 
channels. But this effect applies to all members of the same industry so is not heterogeneously 
distributed. 
4. Reputational resources are innately valuable in the model because of the obvious point that 
reputation occurs in the consumer’s decision rule. This value does not lose its relevance to the 
firm’s competitive advantage when parasitism occurs. A unit of reputation is as valuable in 
securing revenue as it would be without parasitism. Parasitism does diminish the number of 
units of reputation each producer enjoys and therefore the net value they capture. So it does 
reduce the returns from this competition, and the simulation suggested it can reduce the 
heterogeneity of the resource distribution over the competing firms. But whatever resource 
heterogeneity remains plays the same role as before in strategic competition and acquires the 
same value. 
What does not remain the same, of course, is risk. A producer’s quality reputation is an important, 
perhaps the most important, way in which consumers manage the risk of information asymmetry and 
of defective or contaminated products. The erosion of its value as a resource to the producer, through 
the parasitic process, is accompanied by the erosion of its usefulness as a risk control – and by the 
increase in risks such as those arising from defective or contaminated products. Traditionally, 
resource-based value theory attempts to describe and explain firms’ competitive success in terms of 
the heterogeneous distribution of resources like quality reputation. But we need to look more widely 
at what happens to these resources in a firm’s ecology – at parasitism in particular – and we need to 
look more widely at the consequences of such processes, especially erosive processes that accompany 




5.3 Intended contributions 
The intended contributions of this study are as follows: 
1) To make a case for extending the resource-based view to deal with parasitic activity, particularly 
counterfeiting, as well as competition. Counterfeiting is focussed on a producer’s reputational 
resource, so it seems natural to draw on the resource-based view to deal with counterfeiting, and 
this enables us to theorize about competition and parasitism as co-evolving phenomena. 
2) To substantiate an extended resource-based theory with a model of the mechanisms underlying 
this co-evolution. This provides a generative theory, emphasizing the interaction of producers, 
their competitors, consumers and counterfeiters, and how this interaction constitutes competition 
and parasitism as processes over time. The results are outcomes such as counterfeit penetration 
and market breakdown. Taking a computational, agent-based approach produces an essentially 
algorithmic rather than analytical model (Grimm et al, 2015), in which actors can be given 
naturalistic, heuristic decision rules rather than being attributed with formal economic rationality. 
3) To suggest a way of using the model in a straightforward probabilistic risk assessment. Risk is 
central to the model – risk to consumers from information asymmetry, risk of reputation as a risk 
control becoming undermined as a result of parasitism, risk of market penetration by counterfeits 
and risk of exposure to contaminated or defective products. The model produces frequency 
distributions over model outcomes that can be directly related to the effects on public safety.  
 
5.4 Limitations of the work 
Various points were made in the course of the model development on how the model might be made 
more complex and more veridical. Complexities and variations in counterfeiters’ cost structures, for 
instance, were ignored. The issues involved in balancing parsimony and veridicality are dealt with in 
detail by Carley (2009), and more recently by Miller (2015). The essential point for this study has 
been to show how theory can be extended to deal with an important phenomenon that it had not 
formerly incorporated, and to show how models can be set up to apply it to specific cases. The 
emphasis has been on relative simplicity (Burton and Obel, 2011) in the interests of reducing 
epistemic opacity (Miller, 2015). As with other work on the resource-based view, the model is 
stylized and incorporates many simplifications, but the aim is tractability and a concentration on the 
core issues that need exploring. There is nothing stopping further work dealing with the 
simplifications, for example incorporating other actors such as product distributors and state 
authorities. Law making (for example EU, 2011) can obviously have an important direct effect on 
reputational evaluations, for example, as well as indirect effects via deterrents to parasites. The model 
could also incorporate more complex behaviours available to producers, particularly collective 
deterrent action. 
 The study ignores various additional processes that shape resources over time. The lifecycle 
that characterizes resources and capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003), incorporating pivotal events 
26 
 
like renewal and retrenchment, are absent from the model. In reality, the influence of parasitism on 
the reputational resource is superimposed on such a lifecycle, and may well interact with it. A related 
omission is a proper treatment of endowment. Coen and Maritan’s (2011) model, although it 
represents a very different context, shows that the endowment of an operational capability matters, 
sometimes more than the dynamic capability that updates it. In the counterfeiting model, the 
reputational resource is operational in the sense that it contributes directly to competitive advantage. 
This ignores reputation as a dynamic capability or resource. Having a reputation for producing with 
high quality makes a firm a more attractive technology development partner for other firms, a more 
attractive employer for capable individuals, and a more attractive investment for funders. A promising 
line of future work would be to explore the combined operational and dynamic nature of the 
reputational resource, and to assess the relative importance of endowment. 
Although it has been suggested that the model naturally supports probabilistic risk 
assessment, there are some important caveats here as well. Most obviously, a risk assessment is 
carried out to reflect the specific circumstances of the system under analysis as much as general 
theories of processes like parasitism. As the EU falsified medicines directive (EU, 2011) indicates, 
‘risk assessments should consider aspects such as the price of the medicinal product; previous cases of 
falsified medicinal products being reported in the Union and in third countries; the implications of a 
falsification for public health, taking into account the specific characteristics of the products 
concerned; and the severity of the conditions intended to be treated’. This could be further extended to 
consider aspects such as the specific nature of the supply chains into which counterfeits are infiltrated, 
and how the regions in which they operate are likely to influence the penalties counterfeiters face. 
Nonetheless, although there are clear limitations, the study makes a start on recognizing that 
the resources that are central to competition between firms are equally central to illicit, parasitic 
attacks on those firms, and also central to how consumers protect themselves against the risks of 
consuming poor or even dangerous products. It indicates how we might develop and extend a 
resource-based view that has hitherto been focussed strongly on resources underpinning competition, 





Abdelghany, A., Abdelghany, K., Mahmassani, H., Alhalabi, W. (2014). Modeling framework for 
optimal evacuation of large-scale crowded pedestrian facilities. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 237: 1105–1118. 
Adner, R. and Zemsky, P. (2006). A demand-based perspective on sustainable competitive advantage. 
Strategic Management Journal, 27: 215-239. 
27 
 
Ahuja, G. and Katila, R. (2004). Where do resources come from? The role of idiosyncratic situations. 
Strategic Management Journal, 25: 887-907. 
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for ‘lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXIV: 488–500. 
Al-Dhanhani, A., Mizouni, R., Otrok, H. and Al-Rubaie, A. (2014). A game theoretical model for 
collaborative groups in social applications. Expert Systems with Applications, 41: 5056–5065. 
Alexy, O., West, J., Klapper, H. and Reitzig, M. (2018). Surrendering control to gain advantage: 
reconciling openness and the resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 39: 
1704-1727. 
Amini, M., Wakolbinger, T., Racer, M. and Nejad, M.G. (2012). Alternative supply chain production-
sales policies for new product diffusion: an agent-based modeling and simulation approach. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 216: 301-311. 
Arend, R.J. (2015). Mobius’ edge: infinite regress in resource-based and dynamic capabilities views. 
Strategic Organization, 13, 75-85. 
Arend, R.J. and Lévesque, M. (2010). Is the resource-based view a practical organizational theory? 
Organization Science, 21: 913-930. 
Axelrod, R. (1997). The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and 
Collaboration. Princeton University Press (Princeton NJ). 
Barabasi, A. and Albert, R. (1999). Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science, 286: 509. 
Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17: 
99-120. 
Barney, J. B. (1999). How a firm’s capabilities affect boundary decisions. Sloan Management Review, 
40: 137–145. 
Barney, J.B., Ketchen, D.J. and Wright, M. (2011). The future of resource-based theory: revitalization 
or decline? Journal of Management, 37: 1299-1315. 
Bendoly, E. (2007). Resource enablement modeling: implications for studying the diffusion of 
technology. European Journal of Operational Research, 179: 537-553. 
Bendoly, E. (2014). System dynamics understanding in projects: information sharing, psychological 
safety, and performance effects. Production and Operations Management, 23: 1352-1369. 
Bowman, C. and Ambrosini, V. (2003). How the resource-based and the dynamic capability views of 
the firm inform corporate-level strategy. British Journal of Management, 14: 289–303. 
Branco, M.C. and Rodrigues, L.L. (2006). Corporate social responsibility and resource-based 
perspectives. Journal of Business Ethics, 69: 111–132.  
Bromiley, P. and Rau, D. (2016). Operations management and the resource based view: another view. 
Journal of Operations Management, 41: 95-106. 
Bunge, M. (1997). Mechanism and explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 27: 410-465. 
Burton, R.M. and Obel, B. (2011). Computational modeling for what-is, what-might-be, and what-
28 
 
should-be studies – and triangulation. Organization Science, 22: 1195-1202. 
Busby, J.S., Onggo, B.S. and Liu, Y. (2016). Agent-based computational modelling of social risk 
responses. European Journal of Operational Research, 251: 1029-1042. 
Cabral, L. (2016). Living up to expectations: corporate reputation and persistence of firm 
performance. Strategy Science, 1: 2-11. 
Cannon, A.R., Reyes, P.M., Frazier, G.V., and Prater, E.L. (2008). RFID in the contemporary supply 
chain: Multiple perspectives on its benefits and risks. International Journal of Operations and 
Production Management, 28: 433-454. 
Carley, K. (2009). Computational modeling for reasoning about the social behavior of humans. 
Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 15: 47-59. 
Casola, L., Kemp, S. and Mackenzie, A. (2009). Consumer decisions in the black market for stolen or 
counterfeit goods. Journal of Economic Psychology, 30: 162-171. 
Cederman, L.-E. (2005). Computational models of social forms: advancing generative process theory. 
American Journal of Sociology, 110: 864-893. 
Chaudhry, P.E. and Stumpf, S.A. (2011). Consumer complicity with counterfeit products.  Journal of 
Consumer Marketing, 28: 139-151. 
Chauradia, A.J., Echambadi, R., Milewicz, C. and Ganesh, J. (2018). Advancing the resource-based 
view: human capital investments and consumer satisfaction. Academy of Management Proceedings, 
2018, 1, doi: https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2018.13131abstract. 
Cho, S.-H., Fang, X. and Tayur, S. (2015). Combating strategic counterfeiters in licit and ellicit 
supply chains. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 17: 273-289. 
Coen, C.A. and Maritan, C.A. (2011). Investing in capabilities: the dynamics of resource allocation. 
Organization Science, 22: 99-117. 
Cordell, V.V., Wongtada, and Kieschnick, R.L. (1996). Counterfeit purchase intentions: Role of 
lawfulness attitudes and product traits as determinants. Journal of Business Research, 35: 41-53. 
Cuomo, R.E., Mackey, T.K. (2014). An exploration of counterfeit medicine surveillance strategies 
guided by geospatial analysis: lessons learned from counterfeit Avastin detection in the US drug 
supply chain. BMJ Open, 4, e006657. Doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2014-006657. 
Davis, J.P., Eisenhardt, K.M. and Bingham, C.B. (2007). Developing theory through simulation 
methods. Academy of Management Review, 32: 480-499. 
Dierickx, I. and Cool, K. (1989). Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive 
advantage. Management Science, 35: 1504-1511. 
DiMase, D., Collier, Z.A., Carlson, J., Gray, R.B. and Linkov, I. (2016). Traceabiity and risk analysis 
strategies for addressing counterfeit electronics in supply chains for complex systems. Risk Analysis, 
36: 1834-1843. 
Dulleck, U. and Kerschbamer, R. (2006). On doctors, mechanics and computer specialists: the 
economics of credence goods. Journal of Economic Literature, 44: 5–42. 
29 
 
Dyer, J.H. and Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23: 660–679. 
Eisenhardt, K.M. and Martin, J.A. (2000). Dynamic capabilities: what are they? Strategic 
Management Journal, 21: 1105-1121. 
Epstein, J.M. (2008). Why model?  Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 11: 12. 
EU (2011). Directive 2011/62/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. Official Journal of 
the European Union, L174/74. Last accessed on 24/9/18 at https://ec.europa.eu/health/human-
use/falsified_medicines_en. 
Feinberg, R.M. and Rousslang, D.J. (1990). The economic effects of intellectual property right 
infringements. Journal of Business, 63: 79-90. 
Fejes, Z.L. and Wilson, J.M. (2013). Cue utilization in the product authentication process: a 
framework and research agenda for product counterfeit prevention. International Journal of 
Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 37: 317-340. 
Ford, A. and Flynn, H. (2005). Statistical screening of system dynamics models. System Dynamics 
Review, 21: 273–303. 
Freudenberg, W. R. (1993). Risk and recreancy: Weber, the division of labour, and the rationality of 
risk perceptions. Social Forces, 71: 909–932. 
Gigerenzer, G. and Goldstein, D.G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: models of bounded 
rationality. Psychological Review, 103: 650–669. 
Gigerenzer, G. and Brighton, H. (2009). Homo heuristicus: why biased minds make better inferences. 
Topics in Cognitive Science, 1: 107-143. 
Grimm, V., Revilla, E., Berger, U., Jeltsch, F., Mooij, W.M., Railsback, S.F., Thulke, H.-H., Weiner, 
J., Wiegand, T. and DeAngelis, D. (2005). Pattern-oriented modelling of agent-based complex 
systems: lessons from ecology. Science, 310: 987-991. 
Grossman, G.M. and Shapiro, C. (1988a). Counterfeit-product trade. American Economic Review, 78: 
59-75. 
Grossman, G.M. and Shapiro, C. (1988b). Foreign counterfeiting of status goods. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 103: 79-100. 
Hardcopf, R., Gonçalves, P., Linderman, K. and Bendoly, E. (2017). Short-term bias and strategic 
misalignment in operational solutions: Perceptions, tendencies, and traps. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 258: 1004–1021. 
Helfat, C.E. and Peteraf, M.A. (2003). The dynamic resource-based view: capability lifecycles. 
Strategic Management Journal, 24: 997-1010. 
Helton, J.C. and Davis, F.J. (2000). Sample-based methods. In Saltelli, A., Chan, K. and Scott, E.M. 
(eds.). Sensitivity Analysis, Wiley (Chichester, UK), pp. 101-154. 
Hitt, M.A., Xu, K. and Carnes, C.M. (2016). Resource based theory in operations management 
research. Journal of Operations Management, 41: 77-94. 
30 
 
Jackson, G., Patel, S. and Khan, S. (2012). Assessing the problem of counterfeit medications in the 
United Kingdom. International Journal of Clinical Practice, 66: 241-250. 
Juillet, Y. and Vlasto, A.-P. (2005). Counterfeiting of medicinal drugs: issues and threats. 
Fundamental and Clinical Pharmacology, 19: 621–624. 
Kor, Y.Y., Mahoney, J.T. and Michael, S.C. (2007). Resources, capabilities and entrepreneurial 
perceptions. Journal of Management Studies, 44: 1187-1212. 
Kraaijenbrink, J., Spender, J.-C. and Groen, A.J. (2010). The resource-based view: a review and 
assessment of its critiques. Journal of Management, 36: 349-372. 
Kull, A.J., Mena, J.A. and Korchun, D. (2016). A resource-based view of stakeholder marketing. 
Journal of Business Research, 69: 5553-5560. 
Lado, A.A., Boyd, N.G., Wright, P. and Kroll, M. (2006). Paradox and theorizing within the resource-
based view. Academy of Management Review, 31: 115-131. 
Lahiri, A. and Dey, D. (2013). Effects of piracy on quality of information goods. Management 
Science, 59: 245-264. 
Lavie, D. (2006). The competitive advantage of interconnected firms: an extension of the resource-
based view. Academy of Management Review, 31: 638-658. 
Lee, K., Kim, S., Kim, C. O., & Park, T. (2013). An agent-based competitive product diffusion model 
for the estimation and sensitivity analysis of social network structure and purchase time distribution. 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 16: 3. 
Liang, B.A. (2006). Fade to black: importation and counterfeit drugs. American Journal of Law and 
Medicine. 32: 279-323. 
Liebeskind, J. and Rumelt, R.P. (1989). Markets for experience goods with performance uncertainty. 
RAND Journal of Economics, 20: 601-621. 
Loewenstein, G. and Mather, J. (1990). Dynamic processes in risk perception. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 3: 155-175. 
Macal, C.M. and North, M.J. (2010). Tutorial on agent-based modelling and simulation. Journal of 
Simulation, 4: 151-162. 
Mackenzie, S. (2010). Counterfeiting as corporate externality: Intellectual property crime and global 
insecurity. Crime, Law and Social Change, 54: 21–38. 
MacKenzie, C.A. (2014). Summarizing risk using risk measures and risk indices. Risk Analysis, 34,  
2143–2162. 
Mackey, T. K., Liang, B. A., York, P. and Kubic, T. (2015). Counterfeit drug penetration into global 
legitimate medicine supply chains: A Global Assessment. The American Journal of Tropical Medicine 
and Hygiene, 92 (Supplement 6): 59–67. 
Mackey, T.K., Cuomo, R., Guerra, C. and Liang, B.A. (2015). After counterfeit Avastin – what have 
we learned and what can be done? Nature Reviews Clinical Oncology, 12: 302-308. 
31 
 
Macy, M.W. and Willer, R. (2002). From factors to actors: computational sociology and agent-based 
modelling. Annual Review of Sociology, 28: 143-166. 
Makadok, R. (2001). Toward a synthesis of the resource-based and dynamic-capability views of rent 
creation. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 387-401. 
Mesquita, L.F., Anand, J. and Brush, T.H. (2008). Comparing the resource-based and relational 
views: knowledge transfer and spillover in vertical alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 29: 913-
941. 
Miller, J.H. (1998). Active nonlinear tests (ANTs) of complex simulation models. Management 
Science, 44: 820-830. 
Miller, K.D. (2015). Agent-based modeling and organization studies: a critical realist perspective. 
Organization Studies, 36: 175-196. 
Moussaid, M., Brighton, H. and Gaissmaier, W. (2015). The amplification of risk in experimental 
diffusion chains. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112, 5631-5636. 
Muter, B.A., Gore, M.L. and Riley, S.J. (2013). Social contagion of risk perceptions in environmental 
management networks. Risk Analysis, 33: 1489-1499. 
Nagarajan,M.,Shaw,D. and Albores,P.(2012). Disseminating a warning message to evacuate: A 
simulation study of the behaviour of neighbours. European Journal of Operational Research, 220: 
810–819. 
Nelson, P. (1970). Information and consumer behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 78: 311-329. 
Newbert, S.L. (2007). Empirical research on the resource-based view of the firm: an assessment and 
suggestions for future research. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 121-146. 
Newton, P.N., Green, M.D., Fernández, F.M., Day, N.P.J. and White, N.J. (2006). Counterfeit anti-
infective drugs. Lancet Infectious Diseases, 6: 602–13. 
Nuclear Safety (2013). Counterfeit, fraudulent and suspect items. Canadian Nuclear Safety 
Commission, 17th March. Accessed at http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/educational-
resources/feature-articles/counterfeit-fraudulent-and-suspect-items.cfm on 26th November 2015. 
Pacheco-de-Almeida, G. and Zemsky, P. (2007). The timing of resource development and sustainable 
competitive advantage. Management Science, 53: 651-666. 
Pinho de Lima, F.R., Lago Da Silva, A., Filho, M.G. and Dias, E.M. (2018). Systematic review: 
resilience enablers to combat counterfeit medicines. Supply Chain Management: An International 
Journal, 12: 117-135. 
Poortinga, W. and Pidgeon, N.F. (2004). Trust, the asymmetry principle, and the role of prior beliefs. 
Risk Analysis, 24: 1475-1486. 
Priem, R.L. and Butler, J.E. (2001). Is the Resource-Based “View” a useful perspective for strategic 
management research? Academy of Management Review, 26: 22-40.  
Qian, Y. (2008). Impacts of entry by counterfeiters. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123: 1577-1609. 
32 
 
Qian, Y., Gong, Q., & Chen Y.X. (2015). Untangling searchable and experiential quality responses to 
counterfeits. Marketing Science, 34: 522-538. 
Rahmandad, H. (2012). Impact of growth opportunities and competition on firm-level capability 
development trade-offs. Organization Science, 23: 138-154. 
Rahmandad, H. and Sterman, J. (2008). Heterogeneity and network structure in the dynamics of 
diffusion: comparing agent-based and differential equation models. Management Science, 54: 998-
1014. 
Ramello, G.B. (2006). What’s in a sign? Trademark law and economic theory. Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 20: 547-565. 
Roberts, P. W. and Dowling, G.R. (2002). Corporate reputation and sustained superior financial 
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 23: 1077–1093. 
Rokkan, A.I. and Buvik, A. (2003). Inter-firm collaboration and the problem of free riding behaviour: 
an empirical study of voluntary retail chains. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 9: 247-
256. 
Rumelt, R.P. (1984). Towards a strategic theory of the firm. In Lamb, R.B. (ed.), Competitive 
Strategic Management, Prentice-Hall (Englewood Cliffs, NJ), pp. 556-570. 
Saltelli, A. (2002). Sensitivity analysis for importance assessment. Risk Analysis, 22: 579-590. 
Scherer, C.W and Cho, H.C. (2003). A social network contagion theory of risk perception. Risk 
Analysis, 23: 261-267. 
Scott, S.V. and Walsham, G. (2005). Reconceptualizing and managing reputation risk in the 
knowledge economy: toward reputable action. Organization Science, 16: 308-322. 
Senate (2012). Inquiry into counterfeit electronic parts in the Department of Defense supply chain. 
Report 112-167 of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. US Government Printing 
Office, Washington. 
Smith, E.B. and Rand, W. (2018). Simulating macro-level effects from micro-level observations. 
Management Science, Articles in Advance, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2877. 
Stevenson, M. and Busby, J. (2015). An exploratory analysis of counterfeiting strategies. 
International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 35: 110-144. 
Stummer, C., Kiesling, E., Guenther, M. and Vetschera, R. (2015).  Innovation diffusion of repeat 
purchase products in a competitive market: an agent-based simulation approach. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 245: 157-167. 
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G. and Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. 
Strategic Management Journal, 18:509-534. 
Tonn, G.L. and Guikema, S.D. (2018). An agent-based model of evolving community flood risk. Risk 
Analysis, 38: 1258-1278. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974). Heuristics and biases. Science, 185: 1124-1131. 
Veloutsou, C. and Bian, X. (2008). A cross-national examination of consumer perceived risk in the 
33 
 
context of non-deceptive counterfeit brands. Journal of Consumer Behavior, 7: 3–20. 
Weiss, C. (2006). Price inertia and market structure: empirical evidence from Austrian manufacturing. 
Applied Economics, 25, 1175-1186. 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 5: 171-180. 
Wernerfelt, B. (2016). Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm: Foundations of the 
Resource-Based View. Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, UK). 
Wilson, J.M., Sullivan, B.A. and Hollis, M.E. (2016. Measuring the "unmeasurable": approaches to 
assessing the nature and extent of product counterfeiting. International Criminal Justice Review, 26: 
259-276. 
Wood, A.D., Mason, C.F. and Finnoff, D. (2016). OPEC, the Seven Sisters, and oil market 
dominance: an evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling approach. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Ogranization, 132: 66-78. 
WTO. (2011). Available at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm, (last accessed 






P Producers p producer 
rp p’s reputation qp q's price 
zp Demand for p’s products Z(p) p’s consumer base 
ip p's investment in deterrence yp p's disclosure of counterfeits 
bp Proportion of p’s products counterfeit wp,t p's prior price weight at t 
    
C Consumers c consumer 
G Graph of network over C N(c) c’s neighbourhood 
rcp c's evaluation of p kc c’s choice of producer 
yc c’s credulity xc c’s experience of consuming a counterfeit 
lc c’s consumption   
    
F Counterfeiters f Counterfeiter 
uf f’s choice of target ef f’s choice of production level 
vf f’s probability of receiving retaliation   
O Consumption opportunities foregone X Accumulated consumption of counterfeits 




L Network link mean degree   
Mcounterfeit Reputational loss from counterfeit 
experience 
Mgenuine Reputational gain from genuine experience 
V Retaliation trigger multiplier U Retaliation period 
W Deterrence trigger multiplier  D Deterrence increment multiplier 
Q Deterrence price multiplier Y Recreancy ameliorator 
 
